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Abstract	
In	the	last	decade,	Bolivia,	as	with	most	countries	in	the	region,	has	seen	an	unprecedented	
increase	of	 its	prison	population.	This	 is	often	explained	as	 the	consequence	of	a	punitive	
populism	sweeping	Latin	America.	Our	article	investigates	what	triggered	this	punitive	turn	
in	Bolivia	by	 identifying	 some	of	 the	 factors	 that	 impact	 crime	policy	 and	 growing	prison	
populations	since	the	election	of	president	Evo	Morales	 in	2006.	We	argue	that	a	complex	
array	of	 local	and	 international	 factors	and	shifts	 in	crime	policy	 to	harden	approaches	 to	
domestic	 violence	 led	 to	 steep	 increases	 in	 remand	 populations.	 Combined	 with	 other	
inefficiencies	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 this	 led	 to	 sustained	 increases	 in	 the	 prison	
population	 throughout	 most	 of	 this	 period.	 This	 study	 is	 based	 on	 new	 and	 previously	
unstudied	statistical	data	produced	by	 the	Bolivian	 institutions	 in	charge	of	 implementing	
crime	policy.	
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Introduction		
After	 a	 decade	 of	 increasing	 economic	 inequality	 and	 crime	 rates	 in	 the	 1990s,	 most	 Latin	
American	countries	have	hardened	crime	policy	during	the	2000s.	As	a	result,	 these	countries	
have	experienced	unprecedented	increases	of	their	prison	populations	(Riego	and	Duce	2009:	10;	
Stippel	 2013:	 61‐63).1	 Subsequently,	 criminologists	 have	 tried	 to	 explain	 this	 development,	
referring	 to	 it	 as	 the	 ‘punitive	 turn’	 or	 ‘new	 punitiveness’	 (Goldson	 2002;	 Pratt	 2007),	 and	
focusing	 their	 analyses	mostly	 on	 the	phenomena	of	 ‘penal	populism’	 (Paladines	 2016;	 Sozzo	
2014)	or	a	process	of	penal	state	building	(Garland	2015;	Hathazy	and	Müller	2016;	Wacquant	
2009).		
	
In	another	context,	the	punitive	turn	affecting	developed	countries	can	be	explained	partially	by	
the	 rise	 of	 far‐right	 and	 populist	 political	 movements	 which	 use	 the	 punitive	 rhetoric	 as	 an	
essential	element	of	their	anti‐migration	and	xenophobic	discourse	(Hogg	2016).	As	a	result	of	
electoral	competition,	 the	punitive	rhetoric	has	pushed	many	western	governments	 to	harden	
their	criminal	policies	and	to	move	away	from	left	realism	and	the	rehabilitation	ideal	(Matthews	
2014).	This	thesis	seems	heuristic	for	understanding	the	evolution	of	crime	policies	in	developed	
countries.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 argument	 does	 not	 explain,	 in	 our	 opinion,	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	
punitive	 turn	 in	 Latin	 America,	 in	 countries	 where	 leftist	 ‘populist’2	 governments	 came	 into	
power,	as	in	Bolivia,	Ecuador	and	Argentina	in	the	last	two	decades.	Accordingly,	we	argue	that,	
in	Bolivia,	 the	punitive	 turn	cannot	be	understood	primarily	as	 the	consequence	of	a	populist	
political	change.	However,	the	prison	population	has	increased	substantially	since	the	adoption	
of	the	new	constitution	in	2009	and	the	birth	of	the	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia	(the	country’s	
new	official	name).		
	
Evo	Morales	was	elected	President	in	2006,	when	he	was	the	leader	of	the	political	movement	
based	on	the	alliance	between	rural	indigenous	activists	and	middle	class	urban	Marxists	(Errejón	
2011;	García	Linera	2009).	This	movement’s	major	objective	at	that	time	was	to	recover	national	
sovereignty	endangered	mostly	by	the	United	States	(US)	anti‐drugs	intervention	in	the	country.	
After	the	election	of	Morales,	the	new	government	adopted	administrative	measures	based	on	
increasing	 the	 number	 of	 civil	 servants—mostly	 police	 officers	 and	 prosecutors—and	 the	
adoption	of	a	new	preventive	paradigm	in	the	anti‐drug	policy	(Stippel	and	Serrano	Moreno	2016,	
2018).		
	
In	 this	context,	our	article	aims	to	answer	to	the	 following	questions:	How	much	did	not	only	
national	 but	 also	 international	 interests	 shape	 Bolivian	 crime	 policy?	 Does	 the	 incarceration	
trend	mirror	 the	 ‘populist’	 ideology	 and	 rhetoric	 of	Morales’	 government?	Could	 the	 growing	
police	 force	and	 increasing	number	of	prosecutors	be	related	to	the	 incarceration	trend?	How	
does	the	law	as	it	is	practiced	impact	upon	the	implementation	of	crime	policy	in	Bolivia?		
	
Our	sources	are	informed	by	criminal	law	in	force	from	2006	and	2016	and	by	newly	released	
and	previously	unstudied	statistical	data	produced	by	the	Bolivian	crime	policy	institutions.	We	
show	 that	 the	 traditional	 explanations	 for	 the	 punitive	 turn	 to	 some	 extent	 help	 in	 an	
understanding	the	Bolivian	case.	Nevertheless,	the	most	important	factor	from	our	point	of	view	
is	not	the	politicization	of	the	Bolivian	crime	policy	but	its	endemic	inefficient	institutions	that	
lack	professional	public	management	and	general	interest	in	accountability	of	public	servants.	
	
Main	factors	for	the	increasing	prison	population	in	the	region		
The	Argentinian	criminologist,	Máximo	Sozzo	(2014),	has	offered	an	analysis	of	the	evolution	of	
crime	policy	in	his	country.	He	argued	that	penal	populism3	was	a	main	factor	that	determined	
the	harshening	of	crime	policies	and	thus	the	increase	in	the	prison	population.	Sozzo	observed	
that,	up	to	the	end	of	the	last	century,	the	elaboration	of	crime	policy	followed	an	elitist	mode.	It	
focused	on	the	word	and	knowledge	of	the	expert	whose	agenda	was	protected	from	intervention	
by	 the	 general	 public.	 Consequently,	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1990s,	 a	 wave	 of	 ‘penal	 populism’	
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emerged.	Sozzo	qualifies	this	first	wave	of	populism,	as	‘penal	populism	from	above’	(populismo	
penal	desde	arriba)	and	he	argued	that	it	was	generated	mostly	by	political	agendas	and	media.	
For	the	first	time	since	the	end	of	Argentine’s	transition	to	democracy,	what	 ‘people	think	and	
want’	was	emphasized	as	the	main	focus	of	new	policy.	Sozzo	stressed	that	‘penal	populism	from	
above’	also	had	an	elitist	component	because	certain	privileged	actors,	such	as	politicians	and	
journalists,	claimed	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	public	and	presented	their	views	as	unambiguous	
and	preexisting.	The	 ‘experts’	were	seen	to	be	among	the	victims	of	 this	development,	as	they	
were	side‐lined	by	the	elitists	that	made	the	decisions.	Sozzo	argued	that	‘penal	populism	from	
above’	then	turned	out	to	be	the	forerunner	of	the	next	wave	of	policy	changes,	‘penal	populism	
from	below’	(populismo	penal	desde	abajo).		
	
This	new	form	of	penal	populism	implied	that	the	policies	were	pushed	‘from	below’,	following	
the	claims	of	social	movements	and	their	representatives.	As	a	result,	certain	sectors	of	society,	
those	whose	lifestyle	had	been	adversely	affected	by	criminal	activities	or	those	who	had	been	a	
victim	of	crime,	were	able	to	become	representatives	of	the	abstract	notion	of	‘people’.	Using	this	
legitimacy,	they	could	ask	for	changes	in	the	field	of	crime	policy	(Sozzo	2014:	116,	2016:	203).	
Nevertheless,	Sozzo	(2014:	135,	2016:	261)	observed	that	this	development	came	to	a	standstill	
after	the	Argentinian	elections	in	2005.	Since	then,	a	more	moderate	approach	to	crime	policy	has	
been	 in	place.	 Still,	 he	 finds	 it	 is	hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 the	 levels	of	punitiveness	gained	 in	 the	
populist	period	might	be	overcome.	
	
From	 another	 perspective,	 the	 Ecuadorian	 criminologist	 and	 public	 defense	 lawyer,	 Jorge	
Paladines	(2016),	analyzed	the	changes	to	penal	policies	in	Ecuador.	He	argued	that	economic	
factors	are	not	sufficient	to	explain	changes	in	punitiveness.	In	spite	of	Ecuador’s	considerable	
progress	in	reducing	inequality	and	poverty,	the	fact	that	there	were	fewer	poor	people	did	not	
mean	 that	 prison	 occupation	 rates	 were	 reduced.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 poverty	 reduction	
programs	had	been	accompanied	by	an	increase	 in	prison	population	numbers	not	previously	
experienced.	He	argued	that	the	increase	could	not	be	explained	from	an	economic	standpoint;		
instead,	it	provided	evidence	of	the	dysfunctional	character	of	penal	institutions,	because	they	do	
not	 curb	 but	 increase	 selective	 imprisonment	 (Paladines	 2016:	 178).	 Going	 even	 further,	 he	
thinks	that	the	progress	made	in	improving	the	living	conditions	of	Ecuadorians	had	triggered	a	
climate	of	zero	tolerance	towards	crime	(Paladines	2016:	180).		
	
Adopting	 a	 macro‐sociological	 perspective,	 Paul	 Hathazy	 and	 Markus‐Michael	 Müller	 (2016)	
analyzed	what	they	call	the	‘rebirth	of	the	prison	in	Latin	America’	in	order	to	explain	the	punitive	
turn	in	the	region.	They	argued	that	the	expansion	of	police	powers	and	judicial	capacities	along	
with	the	passing	of	more	punitive	legislation	‘unsurprisingly’	led	to	a	boost	in	the	region’s	prison	
population,	 due	 to	 the	 weakness	 of	 what	 they	 labelled	 ‘the	 impartial	 legal	 dimension	 of	 the	
exercise	of	state	power’	(Hathazy	and	Müller	2016:	120).	The	authors	identified	this	flaw—which	
they	thought	was	historical—in	court	practices	and	those	of	the	prosecutors	(Hathazy	and	Müller	
2016).	They	also	thought	that	the	rise	of	the	region’s	inmate	population	was	mainly	related	to	
new	forms	of	‘punishing	the	urban	poor’	(Hathazy	and	Müller	2016:	114).	
	
In	a	broader	and	comparative	approach,	the	United	States	law	professor,	Michael	Tonry	(2007),	
reviewed	the	literature	in	search	of	generalizations	that	help	to	explain	national	differences	in	
penal	 policies	 and	 practices.	 His	 focus	was	 not	 Latin	 America	 but	Western	 countries	 but	 his	
findings	are	helpful	for	our	analysis.		
	
Tonry	understood	penal	 cultures	 and	policies	 to	be	 local;	 thus,	 the	 reasons	 for	harsher	penal	
policies	can	be	found	in	distinctive	cultural,	historical,	constitutional	and	political	conditions.	He	
argued	 that,	 in	 some	 places,	 penal	 policies	 might	 have	 become	 harsher	 but,	 in	 most	 places,	
changes	are	caused	by	adjustments	in	practice	that	moderate	and	sometimes	nullify	the	policy	
variations,	and	by	other	policy	changes	that	move	in	the	opposite	direction.	Tonry	argued	that	
comparisons	of	shifts	 in	penal	policy	also	need	to	differentiate	between	their	enactment,	 their	
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implementation	and	their	practical	use.	In	other	words,	sometimes	policies	are	enacted	to	send	
messages	or	to	make	expressive	or	symbolic	statements	with	no	clear	expectation	that	they	will	
be	implemented	(Torny	2017:	1,	12).	He	argued	there	are	‘nonfactors’	that	do	not	explain	many	
of	 the	 change	 in	 crime	 policies.	 Amongst	 those,	 he	 counts	 social	 and	 economic	 changes;	
politicization	of	crime	policy;	increased	population	diversity	and	intergroup	conflict;	the	effects	
of	 the	women’s,	 gay,	 and	 civil	 rights	movements;	 and	 increasingly	 global	 and	 sensationalistic	
media.	As	those	developments	affect	all	developed	countries,	they	are	just	background	conditions	
without	a	specific	explanatory	value.	Whether	 those	 factors	 impact	crime	policies	depends	on	
their	interaction	with	other	factors	(Torny	2017:	17).	
	
If	we	relate	Tonry’s	findings	to	Sozzo’s	(2014)	arguments,	the	politicization	of	crime	policy	by	
populist	means	would	 be,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 ‘nonfactor’	 if,	 at	 a	 regional	 level,	 they	 could	 be	
considered	 to	 be	 background	 conditions	 affecting	 all	 countries.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Tonry’s	
arguments	would	match	partially	 the	 findings	of	Paladines	(2016).	Both	considered	economic	
factors	 essentially	 unhelpful	 in	 explaining	 penal	 policies	 as	 they	 relate	 to	 incarceration	 rates.	
Regarding	 the	 expansion	 of	 police	 powers	 and	 judicial	 capacities	 and	 also	 more	 punitive	
legislation—factors	mentioned	by	Hathazy	and	Müller	(2016)	and	considered	at	an	earlier	time	
by	Tonry	(2007)—it	is	doubtful	if	those	policy	changes	were	implemented	in	practice	or	if	they	
only	changed	the	laws	in	the	books,	without	much	practical	impact.		
	
We	 now	 consider	 how	 far	 any	 of	 the	 before‐mentioned	 factors	 and	 explanations	 help	 to	
understand	the	changes	of	crime	policy	in	Bolivia.		
	
Legislative	efforts	that	shape	Bolivian	crime	Policy	
Foreign	interests	
If	we	look	at	the	major	legislative	efforts	that	have	shaped	Bolivian	crime	policy,	we	find	that	there	
are	some	particular	influences	not	previously	mentioned.	Contrary	to	the	experience	described	
by	 Sozzo	 (2014)	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Argentina,	 Bolivian	 crime	 policy	 has	 often	 been	 criticized	 for	
responding	 to	 foreign	 interests	 and	 for	being	driven	by	 the	 international	 cooperation	 agenda	
rather	than	by	local	imperatives.	This	is	true,	firstly,	for	the	drug	legislation.		
	
The	major	drug	legislation,	commonly	known	as	‘Law	1008’,	was	published	on	19	July	1988.	It	is	
a	 ‘hybrid’	 law,	 combining	 in	 a	 single	 act	 provisions	 that	 regulate	 production,	 substitution	
measures	and	eradication	of	coca	leaves,	along	with	criminal	and	procedural	law	and	rules	on	
prevention	(Stippel	and	Serrano	Moreno	2018).	Law	1008	has	been	criticized	by	different	sectors	
of	 Bolivian	 society	 and	 from	 different	 perspectives.	 The	 National	 Council	 Against	 Illicit	 Drug	
Trafficking	(CONALTID),4	composed	by	the	Ministers	of	the	Presidency,	Foreign	Affairs,	Defense	
and	Health,	criticized	in	2007	the	approval	of	the	law,	arguing	that	it	responded	mainly	to	external	
demands	without	offering	structural	solutions	to	the	drug	problem	in	Bolivia.	They	argue	that,	on	
the	contrary,	it	contributed	to	the	enslavement	of	history,	identity,	culture,	traditions	and	damage	
to	the	environment	in	the	country	(CONALTID	2017:	18).	The	historian	and	former	president	of	
Bolivia,	Carlos	Mesa	Gisbert	(2017:	64),	considers	Law	1008	to	be	an	instrument	that	bypassed	
the	country's	constitution,	with	special	courts	and	almost	omnipotent	anti‐narcotic	prosecutors.5	
	
The	government	of	President	Evo	Morales	promised	a	review	of	Law	1008	and	eventually	drafted	
a	general	law	on	coca,	published	in	March	2017.	The	new	Coca	General	Law	(Law	906,	published	
on	 8	 March	 2017)	 expands	 the	 areas	 of	 legal	 coca	 leaf	 production	 (from	 12,000	 to	 22,000	
hectares)	and	determines	that	the	Ministry	of	Rural	Development	is	in	charge	of	supervising	the	
commercialization	and	transport	of	coca	leafs.6	It	also	establishes	that	the	coca	plant	is	part	of	the	
cultural	 heritage	 of	 Bolivia,	 protected	 as	 a	 renewable	 natural	 resource	 and	 necessary	 part	 of	
social	cohesion.7	Nevertheless,	the	new	legislation	does	not	replace	the	penal	rules	of	Law	1008	
which	are	still	in	force.8	
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We	find	that	one	of	the	cornerstones	of	Bolivian	crime	policy,	which	accounted	traditionally	for	
more	 than	 half	 of	 Bolivians	 prison	 population9	 and	 still	 makes	 up	 for	 about	 one	 fifth	 of	 all	
incarcerated	persons,10	can	be	understood	as	a	product	of	external	demands.		
	
Political	change	
A	major	shift	in	Bolivia’s	crime	policy	took	place	after	the	new	constitution	was	enacted	in	2009.	
A	wave	of	new	penal	laws	was	passed	by	parliament	(Plurinational	Assembly).	During	the	period	
from	2009	to	2017,	the	Bolivian	legislator	adopted	34	new	laws,	with	an	impact	on	criminal	law.11		
	
Concerning	 the	 legislative	 activity	 in	 the	previous	period,	 from	 the	 end	of	 the	 dictatorship	 in	
Bolivia	in	1982	to	the	promulgation	of	the	new	constitution	in	2009,	a	total	of	13	acts	were	issued	
that	 created	 or	 hardened	 criminal	 offences.12	 During	 the	 short	 transitional	 government	 of	
President	Eduardo	Rodríguez	Veltzé	(from	9	June	2005	to	22	January	2006)	an	act	was	passed	
that	repealed	in	part	rules	increasing	penalties	(Law	2625)	approved	in	the	previous	government.	
	
We	find	that	the	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia	dedicated	considerable	effort	towards	shaping	its	
crime	policy	through	enacting	new	criminal	laws.	Already	the	fourth	law	(known	as	Law	004)	
approved	by	 the	new	Plurinational	 Legislative	Assembly	 in	 2010	created	 eight	 new	 statutory	
offences,	 all	 linked	 to	 the	 ‘fight’	 against	 corruption.13	 The	 law	was	 not	 limited	 to	 identifying	
offences;	 it	also	created	both	anti‐corruption	courts	and	special	anti‐corruption	prosecutors.14	
Accordingly,	 the	National	 Council	 to	 Combat	 Corruption,	 Illicit	 Enrichment	 and	 Legitimacy	 of	
Illicit	Profits	was	established.15	
	
It	 does	 not	 seem	 coincidental	 that	 this	 first	 law	with	 relevance	 to	 crime	 policy—Law	 004—
formed	 institutions	 similar	 to	 those	 foreseen	 in	 Law	1008,	 including	 specialized	 courts16	 and	
prosecutors,17	 and	 an	 inter‐ministerial	 council18	 dedicated	 to	 approve,	 among	 other	 things,	 a	
national	plan	to	fight	against	corruption.19	It	appears	that	the	Bolivian	legislator	wanted	to	signal	
that,	from	now	on,	the	priorities	of	criminal	policy	were	different.	
	
Another	similarity	between	Law	1008	and	Law	004	concerns	their	deficiencies	in	the	protection	
of	 civil	 rights.	 Although	 Law	 004	 represents	 progress	 because	 it	 no	 longer	 violates	 the	
presumption	of	 innocence	or	 the	 right	 to	defense	as	did	Law	1008,	 the	new	 law	 infringes	 the	
general	principle	of	the	prohibition	of	retroactivity	of	ex	post	facto	criminal	laws	recognized	in	
many	foreign	democratic	constitutions.	Indeed,	art.	123	of	Constitution	of	the	Plurinational	State	
of	Bolivia	specifically	recognizes	the	retroactive	effects	of	criminal	law	concerning	political	and	
administrative	corruption	for	‘crimes	committed	by	public	servants	against	the	interests	of	the	
State’.	The	constitution	attempted	to	allow	the	prosecution	of	politicians	and	public	servants	of	
the	‘ancien	régime’	for	actions	dated	before	the	enactment	of	the	new	constitution	in	7	February	
2009	and	later	qualified	as	crimes	by	the	news	laws	adopted	by	the	new	authorities.	However,	
this	objective	failed	mostly	because	the	Constitutional	Tribunal	of	the	new	Plurinational	State	of	
Bolivia	(Tribunal	Constitucional	Plurinacional)	ruled,	in	its	decision	No.	0770/2012	of	13	August	
2012,	that	Law	004	cannot	punish	retroactively	a	conduct	that	was	not	previously	established	in	
a	Law		
	
Several	further	acts	show	how	the	priorities	in	crime	policy	shifted.	The	Plurinational	Legislative	
Assembly	 enacted,	 for	 example,	 laws	 that	 claim	 to	 protect,	 through	 criminal	 law,	 highly	
vulnerable	indigenous	people	(Law	450)	and	the	national	cultural	heritage	(Law	530).	Other	acts	
respond	 to	 political	 contingencies	 such	 as	 the	 laws	 that	 foresee	 sanctions	 for	 irresponsible	
tendency	 of	 dangerous	dogs	 (Law	553),	 or	misappropriation	of	 funds	 in	 sport	 activities	 (Law	
804).	Some	rules	can	be	linked	with	the	pressure	exerted	by	certain	interest	groups	that	pushed	
for	penal	 laws	or	their	modification	as	part	of	their	political	agenda.	Here	we	find	the	act	that	
claims	to	prevent	penal	 sanctions	to	be	 imposed	 in	 labor	strikes	(Law	316)	and	 the	 laws	that	
create	new	rules	and	penalties	for	acts	of	cruelty	against	animals	(Law	700).	
Jörg	Stippel,	Juan	Serrano	Moreno:	Explanations	for	the	Punitive	Turn	of	Crime	Policy	in	Bolivia,	2006‐2016	
IJCJ&SD								38	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(4)	
It	 appears	 that,	 nowadays,	 it	 is	 not	 only	 international	 pressure	 and	 foreign	 interests	 that	 are	
shaping	 the	 crime	policy	of	 the	Plurinational	 State	of	Bolivia,	 but	 that	national	politics	 is	 also	
playing	a	major	role.	Examination	of	available	statistics	may	indicate	whether	these	legislative	
changes	have	had	a	practical	impact	in	terms	of	registered	offences	and	incarcerations,	to	which	
we	now	turn.		
	
Impact	on	the	crime	statistics	
Registered	offences		
If	we	analyze	the	number	of	offences	registered	by	the	Bolivian	Police	(see	Table	1),	we	find	that	
there	 was	 a	 steady	 decrease	 in	 the	 number	 of	 offences	 registered	 in	 the	 period	 from	 2000	
(47,300)	to	2005	(32,150).	From	2005	to	2015	the	total	number	of	registered	offences	steadily	
grew	to	an	all‐time	high	 in	2015	(88,895)	although,	 in	2016	 (the	 last	year	 for	which	data	are	
available)	the	total	number	of	registered	offences	decreased.	If	we	look	at	the	relative	figures	(the	
number	of	registered	offences	per	100,000	inhabitants),	we	find	that,	in	2000,	the	probability	of	
becoming	a	victim	of	a	crime	(561	per	100,000	population)	was	almost	identical	to	more	than	a	
decade	later	(in	2011,	567	inhabitants	per	100,000	population);	even	so,	there	was	an	increase	
of	more	than	10,000	registered	offences.	
	
Table	1:	General	criminality	registered	by	the	Bolivian	Police	(2000‐2016)	
Year	 Total	of	offences	registered	 Estimated	Population	 Rate	per	100,000	population	
2000	 47,300	 8,427,790 561	
2001	 43,782	 8,588,068 510	
2002	 36,565	 8,748,345 418	
2003	 36,162	 8,908,625 406	
2004	 36,015	 9,068,890 397	
2005	 32,150	 9,229,155 348	
2006	 35,463	 9,389,422 378	
2007	 39,817	 9,549,689 417	
2008	 45,768	 9,709,958 471	
2009	 49,815	 9,870,229 504	
2010	 58,436	 10,030,501 583	
2011	 57,756	 10,190,775 567	
2012	 62,602	 10,351,118 605	
2013	 72,331	 10,507,789 688	
2014	 68,918	 10,665,841 646	
2015	 88,895	 10,825,013 821	
2016	 85,613	 10,985,059 779	
Sources:	
2000	 to	 2014	 offences	 data:	 Bolivia’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics,	 Table	 No.	 3090203	 (available	 at	
http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/introduccion‐6/introduccion‐3;	accessed	25	April	2017).	
2015	and	2016	offences	data:	Bolivian	Police	(2016:	10).		
Estimated	 population	 data:	 Bolivia’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics,	 Table	 No.	 20107	 (available	 at	
http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/introduccion‐5/introduccion‐2;	accessed	25	April	2017).	
	
The	decrease	in	the	offences	registered	in	the	first	five	years	of	the	new	century	could	be	related	
to	the	social	unrest	that	lead	the	former	president	to	flee	the	country	after	an	estimated	68	people	
were	killed	in	riots	after	the	declaration	of	martial	law,	many	on	the	central	square	of	La	Paz	and	
in	 El	 Alto	 in	 October	 2003.20	 The	 future	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 whole	 was	 uncertain.	 People	 lost	
confidence	in	the	state	institutions	including	the	police	force,	and	they	therefore	sought	to	solve	
their	 problems	 without	 the	 help	 of	 the	 police.21	 After	 Evo	 Morales	 was	 elected	 president	 in	
December	2005	with	an	absolute	majority	(54	per	cent),	state	institutions	gathered	strength	and	
the	general	population	regained	sufficient	confidence	to	again	report	crimes	to	the	police.		
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The	data	support	the	hypothesis	that	a	weak	and	de‐legitimized	state	is	at	least	one	determinant	
for	a	softer	approach	to	crime	policy.	Hence,	in	the	case	of	Bolivia,	a	harsher	crime	policy	might	
not	be	so	much	associated	with	punitive	legislative	measures	but	with	the	re‐legitimization	of	
state	institutions.22	
	
Type	of	offences	registered		
The	type	of	offences	registered	by	the	Bolivian	police	allows	us	to	draw	further	conclusions.	For	
our	 analysis,	 we	 focused	 on	 the	 development	 of	 the	 offences	 registered	 that	 relate	 to	 the	
proliferation	of	special	laws.	We	looked	at	offences	related	to	corruption	(Ley	004)	and	racism	
(Ley	045).	
	
Registered	offences	committed	against	the	public	service	include	corruption	of	public	servants.	
Most	of	these	laws	were	made	tougher	by	Law	004	of	the	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia.	The	data	
show	that	the	number	of	offences	registered	under	this	rubric	had	already	increased	in	the	years	
before	 Law	 004	 was	 enacted	 in	 2009	 (see	 Table	 2).	 Nevertheless	 from	 2009	 to	 2014,	 the	
registered	offences	increased	almost	 fourfold	(from	832	to	3,163).	To	a	 lesser	degree	but	also	
noteworthy,	 the	number	of	 crimes	 related	 to	 corruption	and	mismanagement	 in	 the	 judiciary	
doubled	over	the	same	period	(from	369	in	2009	to	778	in	2014).	Similar	increases	occurred	with	
offences	related	to	dignity,	amongst	them	crimes	like	racism	and	discrimination,	which	doubled	
from	2009	to	2014	(from	299	to	616).23		
	
Table	2:	Offences	reported	by	police	according	to	committed	offence	
	
	
	
Year	
Against	civil	
service/	
public	
function1	
Against	
judicial	
function2	
Crimes	
against	
human	
dignity3	
Crimes	
against	sexual	
freedom4	
	
	
	
Homicide5	
2000	 270	 107 193 3,344 3,078	
2001	 279	 126 124 2,587 2,957	
2002	 199	 114 126 2,128 2,610	
2003	 337	 215 76 2,088 2,565	
2004	 283	 223 70 2,509 3,748	
2005	 465	 251 30 1,415 876	
2006	 392	 243 139 2,153 2,724	
2007	 483	 206 84 2,480 1,013	
2008	 542	 313 259 2,584 1,216	
2009	 832	 369 299 3,068 1,130	
2010	 1,363	 330 2 3,965 2,299	
2011	 1,904	 357 286 3,606 2,586	
2012	 2,432	 493 588 4,857 2,671	
2013	 2,440	 679 666 4,845 2,494	
2014	 3,163	 778 616 4,154 2,363	
2015	 1,617	 128 0 2,305 1,712	
2016	 1,025	 385 157 1,528 1,664	
1	See	art.	142	to	165	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code	
2	See	art.	166	to	185	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code,	modified	by	art.	34	of	Law	004.		
3	See	art.	281	bis	to	281	nonies	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code,	introduced	and	modified	by	art.	23	of	
Law	045	enacted	8	October	2010.		
4	See	art.	308	to	322	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code.	
5	See	art.	251	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code.	
	
Source:	 Bolivia’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (INE),	 Table	 No.	 3090203	 (available	 at		
https://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/seguridad‐ciudadana/introduccion‐3	 (accessed	 26	 October	
2018.	Latest	available	data	at	time	of	writing	is	to	2016.	This	source	has	the	most	detailed	concerning	
registered	offences.	
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The	data	 indicate	that	 the	proliferation	of	special	 laws	contributed	to	 the	 increase	of	offences	
registered	 by	 the	 police.	 This	 does	 not	 automatically	 imply	 that	 the	 same	 is	 true	 for	 the	
incarceration	rates.	In	fact,	the	prison	population	trend	does	not	directly	mirror	the	development	
of	the	registered	offences.		
	
Increasing	incarceration	
There	was	a	decline	in	the	total	prison	population	in	the	early	years	of	the	twenty‐first	century	
(from	8,124	in	2000	to	5,669	in	2003)	that	might	have	been	influenced	by	the	enactment	of	the	
new	act	on	 criminal	proceedings	known	as	Law	1970	 (in	May	2001).24	Nevertheless	 the	 total	
numbers	remained	relatively	stable	until	2009	(8,096)	and,	since	then,	there	has	been	a	steady	
and	steep	increase	until	2016	(15,056	prisoners).	Figure	1	and	Table	3	illustrate	these	trends:		
	
Figure	1:	Prison	population	trend	(per	100,000	of	national	population)	
	
Table	3:	Prison	population	trends	
	
	
	
Year	
Prison	population	 Pre‐trial	detainees	
Total	(including	
pre‐trial	detainees)	
Rate	(per	100,000	
total	population)	
	
Number	
%	of	total	prison	
population	
2000	 8,124	 96 5,415 66,4	
2001	 5,565	 65 3,747 67,2	
2002	 6,077	 69 3,932 64,8	
2003	 5,669	 64 4,434 78,2	
2004	 6,495	 72 4,790 73,7	
2005	 6,793	 74 5,029 74.0	
2006	 7,031	 75 5,232 74,4	
2007	 7,683	 80 5,672 73,8	
2008	 7,435	 77 5,240 70,5	
2009	 8,096	 82 6,074 75,2	
2010	 9,406	 94 7,259 77,2	
2011	 11,195	 110 9,357 83,6	
2012	 14,272	 138 12,163 85,2	
2013	 14,415	 137 11,996 83,2	
2014	 14,220	 133 11,642 81,9	
2015	 13,593	 126 n.a. n.a.	
2016	 15,056	 137 10,212 67,8	
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Sources:		
June	 2000‐June	 2014	 data:	 Bolivia’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics,	 Table	 No.	 3090403	 (available	 at	
http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/introduccion‐6/introduccion‐5	(accessed	26	October	2018	
June	 2015	 data:	 Plan	 Estratégico	 Nacional	 de	 la	 Dirección	 General	 de	 Régimen	 Penitenciario	 2016	 ‐2020:	 17,	 21,	
unpublished	internal	document	Penitentiary	General	Direction.		
July	2016	data:	Penitentiary	General	Direction,	unpublished	internal	document	DGRP‐EST	No.	038/16,	17	August	2016.	
 
The	 prison	 population	 grew	 around	 75	 per	 cent	 from	 2000	 (8,124)	 to	 2014	 (14,220).	 In	
comparison,	registered	offences	increased	by	46	per	cent	over	the	same	timeframe	(from	47,300	
in	2000	 to	68,918	 in	2014).	Therefore,	 responses	 to	 a	 growing	number	 of	 crimes	might	have	
received	answers	other	than	prison,	which	could	be	a	positive	development	as	it	could	mean	that	
penal	sanctions	were	being	diversified.		
	
Nevertheless,	 if	 we	 look	 at	 the	 evolution	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	 pre‐trial	 detainees,	 this	 possible	
conclusion	appears	to	be	less	likely.	Thus	far,	the	absolute	peak	of	the	pre‐trial	detention	rates	
was	 reached	 in	 2012	with	more	 than	 85	 per	 cent	 (12,163)	 of	 all	 prisoners	 being	 on	 remand	
detention.	In	the	following	years	to	2016	(data	are	not	available	for	2015),	we	can	see	a	continued	
decrease	(down	to	67.8	per	cent	in	2016).		
	
Judges	are	legally	obliged	to	modify	the	pre‐trial	detention	order	for	a	less	invasive	measure	or	
to	lift	it	at	any	time	if	they	find	that	the	facts	that	originally	backed	their	decision	changed	in	favor	
of	the	suspect.25	Nevertheless,	 the	fact	 that	still	almost	70	per	cent	of	the	prison	population	is	
made	up	by	pre‐trial	detainees	indicates	that	judges	do	not	act	this	way.	Thus,	the	system	did	not	
find	other	answers	to	crime	than	prison;	rather,	it	did	not	find	any	answer	at	all.	
	
In	order	to	gain	a	better	understanding	of	the	practical	impact	of	the	latest	changes	that	Bolivia’s	
crime	policy	has	experienced,	we	examined	the	data	related	to	the	offences	for	which	prisoners	
were	detained	in	2016	(see	Table	4).	Most	people	were	detained	for	robbery	(3,497	or	23	per	
cent	of	the	total	prison	population),	followed	by	persons	accused	of	or	sentenced	for	rape	(2,985	
or	 20	 per	 cent)	 or	 for	 drug	 related	 offences	 (2,977	 or	 20	 per	 cent).	 Persons	 accused	 of	 or	
sentenced	 for	murder	 and	 homicide	 comprised	 another	 14	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 prison	 population	
(1,274	for	murder;	625	for	homicide;	and	262	for	intent	of	homicide).	
	
It	is	surprising	that,	in	spite	of	the	high	sanctions	associated	with	corruption,	the	thousands	of	
offences	apparently	related	to	acts	of	corruption	by	civil	servants	or	the	 judiciary	(there	were	
almost	 4,000	 such	 offences	 registered	 in	 2014),	 none	 appeared	 as	 detainees	 in	 the	 prison	
statistics.	Hence,	it	seems	that	Law	004,	the	first	law	of	the	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia	that	was	
aimed	 at	 containing	 new	 offences	 and	 increasing	 sanctions	 for	 several	 existing	 ones,	 did	 not	
contribute	to	the	increase	in	the	incarceration	rate.		
	
We	 cannot	 correlate	 these	 data	 with	 other	 statistics.	 But,	 the	 apparent	 lower	 rates	 of	
incarceration	 for	 corruption	 could	 be	 related	 to	 several	 circumstances.	 For	 instance,	many	of	
those	crimes	associated	with	corruption	are	difficult	to	prove	in	court	and	might	involve	legally	
trained	citizens—and/or	people	who	have	 the	means	 to	bribe	somebody—so	they	have	more	
chances	to	escape	prosecution	than	a	person	who,	for	example,	commits	a	robbery.	Crimes	of	the	
powerful	 such	 as	 corruption	 are	 systemically	 under‐criminalised	 (Barak	 2015).	 Thus,	 the	
statistics	 indicate	that	prosecuting	corruption	in	Bolivia	needs	more	a	sophisticated	system	of	
detection	and	prosecution	 in	order	 to	be	effective.	Enacting	a	 tougher	 law	has	not	 lead	 to	 the	
imposition	of	tougher	sanctions.		
	
Nevertheless,	the	statistics	show	that	another	special	law	of	the	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia—
Law	348	enacted	in	March	2013,26	the	law	meant	to	guarantee	women	a	life	without	violence—
apparently	had	a	considerable	impact	on	the	incarceration	rate.	This	act	elevated	the	minimum	
penalty	for	rape	from	four	to	15	years27	and	created	offences	like	feminicide,28	family	or	domestic	
violence29	and	sexual	harassment.30	
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Table	4:	Incarceration	according	to	crime	committed/accusation,	2016	
Offence	 Number	of	detained	persons		
Robbery	 3,497	
Rape	 2,985	
Drug	related	(Law	1008)	 2,977	
Murder	 1,274	
Homicide	 625	
Minor	offences	 734	
Dishonest	abuse	 459	
Fraud	 472	
Domestic	violence		 309	
Serious	injuries	 301	
Intent	of	homicide	 262	
Theft	 226	
Lack	of	family	assistance	 173	
Intent	of	rape	 159	
Intent	of	robbery	 122	
Feminicide	 99	
Rape	of	minors	 91	
Falsification	of	documents	 90	
Kidnapping		 71	
Human	trafficking	 68	
Attempted	murder	 62	
Total		 15,056	
Source:	Penitentiary	General	Direction:	See	art.	301	Nos.	1	and	302	of	Law	1970.	
	
The	 high	 minimum	 penalty	 for	 rape	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 judges	 are	 requested	 to	 impose	 the	
preventive	 detention	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	 women	 during	 the	 investigation31	 contributes	
towards	the	elevated	percentage	of	people	imprisoned	under	these	charges.	
	
Growing	of	control	institutions		
Alongside	the	increase	in	registered	offences,	the	numbers	of	persons	employed	within	the	main	
institutions	 in	charge	of	controlling	crime	steadily	grew.	In	the	 last	decade,	 the	Police	and	the	
General	Prosecutor’s	Office	have	benefitted	from	a	constant	increase	in	their	staff	and	budget.32	
	
The	personnel	resources	of	 the	police	 force	 increased	by	about	50	per	cent	 in	the	 last	decade	
(from	23,756	in	200433	to	36,567	in	201634).	It	is	noteworthy	that	the	most	substantial	increase,	
more	than	7,000	officers,	took	place	between	2006	(26,503)	and	2007	(33,523).	In	his	report	to	
the	nation,	the	President	underlined	that,	in	2005,	there	was	one	officer	per	360	inhabitants	and	
that,	during	his	government,	this	number	grew	to	one	officer	per	304	inhabitants	by	2013.	His	
goal	was	to	reach	a	rate	of	one	police	officer	per	250	inhabitants	by	2025,	which	would	point	to	a	
total	number	of	45,000	officers	by	that	year	(Morales	2013:	17).		
	
The	largest	increase	in	police	force	numbers	took	place	after	Morales	gained	power	in	January	
2006	when	about	7,000	additional	police	officers	were	appointed.	The	year	before	he	became	
President,	while	the	country	was	being	ruled	(from	March	2005)	by	a	transitional	government	
prior	to	the	December	2005	general	election,	the	crime	rate	decreased	(from	397	per	100,000	
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population	 in	 2004	 to	 348	 per	 100,000	 population	 in	 2005).	 Arguably,	 the	 appointment	 of	
additional	police	officers	were,	to	some	extent,	aimed	at	stabilizing	the	processes	of	policy	and	
institutional	change	anticipated	after	the	election	of	a	new	President.		
	
Part	of	the	increase	in	registered	offences	 from	2007	onwards	could	then	be	explained	by	the	
growth	in	police	force	numbers	and	thus	more	police	activity	aimed	at	detecting	offenders.	Hence	
a	larger	police	force	could	be	another	factor	pushing	up	rates	of	reported	crimes.		
	
Parallel	to	the	increase	in	police	numbers	was	the	steady	growth	in	the	number	of	prosecutors.	
Upon	 full	 implementation	 of	 the	 Criminal	 Procedure	 Code	 on	 30	 May	 2001,	 the	 number	 of	
prosecutors	 had	 increased	 from	 220	 to	 311	 (Ledezma	 2005:	 215).	 In	 2011,	 there	 were	 411	
prosecutors;	this	rose	to	498	in	2015	(Delgadillo	Ramírez	and	Mayta	2015:	134).		
	
It	is	interesting	to	note	that	a	considerable	proportion	of	the	General	Prosecutor’s	Office	budget	
is	 donated	 by	 different	 international	 agencies.	 If	 we	 look	 at	 the	 recent	 development,	 the	
percentage	of	the	budget	supplied	by	international	cooperation	decreased	from	eight	per	cent	in	
2010	and	2011	to	three	per	cent	in	2013.35	Many	of	the	funds	from	international	cooperation—
mainly	from	UNICEF,	UN	Women	and	from	Denmark—go	into	investigating	crimes	committed	
against	women	(General	Prosecutor	of	the	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia	2015:	38).	As	we	saw	in	
Table	 2,	 crimes	 committed	 against	 women	 fluctuated	 accordingly	 with	 the	 decrease	 of	 the	
international	cooperation	funds.	Table	4	also	shows	their	impact	on	the	composition	of	the	prison	
population.	
	
Inefficient	institutions	
The	lack	of	efficiency	of	the	justice	system	has	a	direct	impact	on	the	prison	population	trend.	If	
we	look	at	the	percentage	of	cases	that	are	pending	each	year	at	the	entrance	courts	(Juzgados	de	
Instrucción),	we	find	that	more	than	half	(69	per	cent	in	2013;	57	per	cent	in	2014;	52	per	cent	in	
2015)	of	all	cases	are	not	being	dealt	with	each	year.	They	accumulate	into	lengthy	delays	in	court	
appearances.		
	
Table	5:	Caseload	at	the	entrance	courts	in	capital	cities	and	El	Alto,	2013‐2015	
	
Year	
Total	case	load	at	
entrance	courts	
Pending	cases	at	courts	at	
the	end	of	the	fiscal	year	
Percentage	of	unresolved	
cases	
2013	 208,517	 143,295 69		
2014	 202,360	 115,038 57	
2015	 235,159	 123,009 52	
Source:	Authors’	analyses	of	statistical	yearbooks	(Judicial	Council	2013:	420,	2014:	420,	2015:	420)	
	
The	large	number	of	pending	cases	is,	to	a	large	extent,	also	the	responsibility	of	the	prosecutors.	
In	2015,	prosecutors	 in	 the	capital	cities	and	El	Alto	 formalized	charges	 in	13,096	cases.36	An	
additional	5,961	cases	were	presented	outside	the	capital	cities,37	making	a	total	of	19,057	formal	
charges	 filed	 on	 a	 national	 level.	 That	 means	 that,	 on	 average,	 each	 of	 the	 498	 prosecutors	
presented	about	38	formal	charges	in	the	year,	amounting	to	less	than	one	per	week.		
	
The	most	 common	way	 prosecutors	 end	 a	 case	 is	 to	 file	 refusal	 reports.	 Generally	when	 this	
happens,	 the	 Police	 Force—under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 General	 Prosecutor’s	 Office—has	 been	
unable	to	identify	the	possible	perpetrator.38	In	practice,	the	case	is	archived	and	ends	without	
anyone	being	held	accountable	for	the	alleged	commission	of	the	reported	crime.	We	have	to	bear	
in	mind	 that	 the	maximum	 duration	 of	 preliminary	 police	 investigations	 shall	 not	 exceed	 20	
days.39	By	the	end	of	this	period,	the	police	should	send	their	report	to	the	prosecutors,	who	then	
should	analyze	the	content	immediately.	In	exceptional	cases,	the	law	allows	the	extension	of	this	
period40	 if	 authorized	 by	 the	 courts.	Within	 the	 same	 terms,	 decisions	 on	 refusals	 should	 be	
taken.41	For	this	reason,	we	calculate	the	percentage	of	cases	refused	each	year	 in	accordance	
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with	 the	 new	 cases	 initiated	 at	 courts;	 the	 possible	 overlap	 should	 not	 alter	 the	 observed	
tendency.	
	
Of	the	121,255	new	cases	reported	to	the	entrance	courts	in	2013	in	the	provincial	capitals	and	
El	Alto,	47,059	(39	per	cent)	concluded	with	a	refusal.	This	number	increased	the	following	year	
to	64,215	refusals	(77	per	cent)	of	the	83,852	cases;	and	to	81,028	(87	per	cent)	refusals	of	93,172	
new	 cases	 in	 2015.	Hence,	 despite	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 police	 and	 prosecutors,	 the	
percentage	of	unresolved	crimes	was	steadily	increasing.	
	
Table	6:	Cases	refused	and	formal	charges	filed	at	entrance	courts	in	capital	cities	and	El	Alto,	2013‐
2015	
	
Year	
Number	of	new	cases	
reported	to	courts	 Cases	refused	
Formal	charges	
filed	at	court1	
Formal	charges	filed	in	
special	procedures1	
2013	 121,255	 47,059 9,232 6,207	
2014	 83,852	 64,215 12,901 7,790	
2015	 93,172	 81,028 13,096 9,587	
1	These	numbers	refer	to	cases	where	the	suspect	was	detained	in	the	act	(in	flagranti)	and	a	special	procedure	is	used.	
See	art.	227	to	230	and	393	bis.	of	Law	1970.		
Source:	Authors’	analyses	of	statistical	yearbooks	(Judicial	Council	2013:	420,	2014:	420,	2015:	420)	
	
The	data	indicate	that	there	is	a	serious	organizational	problem	at	the	General	Prosecutor’s	Office.	
In	the	Institutional	Strategic	Plan,	the	General	Prosecutor’s	Office	itself	established	that	the	core	
issue	adversely	affecting	 its	 internal	organization	 is	due	 to	 the	 limited	and	 inefficient	 internal	
management	and	organization	of	the	entity	(General	Prosecutor	2014:	35‐36).	They	attribute	the	
problem	to	organizational	design,	incipient	planning	and	management	control	systems,	informal	
and	non‐automated	information	systems,	lack	of	explicit	processes	and	procedures	to	guide	the	
administrative	 management,	 among	 others.	 The	 General	 Prosecutor’s	 Office	 assures	 that	 the	
organization	is	undergoing	a	reform	since	the	passing	of	the	new	Basic	Law	of	July	2012	and	the	
designation	of	the	General	Prosecutor	who	is	in	charge	of	dismantling	‘the	corrupt,	perverse	and	
inefficient	structure	of	the	General	Prosecutor’s	Office’	(General	Prosecutor	2014:	22).	
	
It	is	noteworthy	that	the	internal	management	issues	of	the	General	Prosecutor’s	Office	are	not	
new	or	unknown.	A	decade	ago,	Ledezma	(2005)	declared	that	one	of	the	most	worrisome	aspects	
of	the	transformation	of	the	Bolivian	criminal	justice	was	the	fact	that	the	General	Prosecutor’s	
Office	 had	 not	 become	 a	 leading	 institution	 in	 the	 reform,	 and	 that	 their	 annual	 operative	
programs	 disregarded	 indicators	 that	 showed	 the	 (in)efficiency	 and	 (under)achievement	 of	
institutional	goals	(Ledezma	2005:	213).	Ledezma	(2005:	219)	indicated	that	the	data	produced	
each	year	had	no	impact	on	the	Institution	because	the	data	were	not	being	analyzed	to	improve	
performance.	While	this	is	disturbing,	the	recent	declarations	of	the	General	Prosecutor	justify	
some	hope	for	change;	nevertheless,	the	numbers	still	do	not.		
	
The	data	on	the	refusals	also	aid	the	assessment	of	the	quality	of	the	work	done	by	the	National	
Police	and	the	General	Prosecutor’s	Office	when	leading	the	investigations.	If	more	than	80	per	
cent	of	the	cases	prepared	by	police	cannot	be	used	to	file	a	case	at	court,	there	is	a	systemic	lack	
of	quality	control	in	the	preparation	of	cases,	and	other	deficiencies	in	the	functional	management	
of	criminal	investigations.42	It	is	also	impossible	to	pursue	specific	goals,	such	as	increasing	the	
percentage	of	cleared	crimes	with	regard	to	homicide,	rape	or	theft	or	any	other	felony,	if	there	is	
no	 guidance	 nor	 any	 data	 about	 investigation	 refusals	 differentiated	 by	 type	 of	 crime.	 The	
consequence	is	that	the	police	determine	the	‘what’	and	‘how’	of	investigations;	they	are	the	gate‐
keepers	of	the	criminal	justice	system.	One	of	the	main	goals	of	the	criminal	procedure	reform	
fully	enacted	in	mid	2001—to	professionalize	the	investigation	work	in	order	to	prosecute	more	
complex	crimes—is	clearly	failing	in	practice.		
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Conclusions	
The	 Bolivian	 criminal	 justice	 policy	 lacks	 coherence.	 It	 is	 plagued	 with	 systemic	 flaws	 in	
processing	and	prosecuting	crimes.	While	harsher	sentences	were	introduced	for	some	crimes	
(that	is,	corruption)	and	new	crimes	added	to	those	punishable,	the	dysfunction	in	the	system	did	
not	 automatically	 lead	 to	 more	 practical	 punitivitness.	 If	 the	 idea	 of	 all	 those	 legal	 and	
institutional	changes	ever	was	to	establish	a	‘rule	through	law’	(Hathazy	and	Müller	2015:	116),	
any	such	intent	failed	in	Bolivia	due	to	deficiencies	of	internal	organization,	weak	management	
and	a	lack	of	strategic	orientation.	Thus	we	agree	with	some	of	the	main	findings	of	Tonry	(2007)	
that,	in	order	to	understand	the	punitive	turn	observable	in	many	countries	both	in	the	Global	
North	and	South,	we	need	to	focus	on	legal	practice	at	a	local	level	that	can	neutralize	the	policy	
changes	and	adopt	a	multi‐factorial	approach	centered	on	concrete	local	particularities.	
	
The	Bolivian	case	also	illustrates	that	some	legal	modifications	did	result	in	more	offenders	going	
to	prison—and	for	longer	terms—for	violence	against	women	(Law	348).	The	enactment	of	this	
law	has	been	accompanied	by	efforts	to	strengthen	the	prosecution	of	these	crimes,	counting	also	
on	 support	 from	 international	 cooperation.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 high	 percentage	 of	 alleged	
offenders	for	pre‐trial	detention	casts	some	doubt	on	whether	this	policy	change	will	lead	to	more	
convictions	or	 just	 to	more	people	awaiting	 trial.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	new	anti‐corruption	
legislation	(Law	004)	appears	to	make	a	symbolic	statement,	as	 it	 is	without	a	 real	 impact	on	
practice,	as	the	statistics	in	Tables	2	and	4	show.	
	
Both	 examples	 support	 Tonry’s	 thesis	 that,	 even	 when	 penal	 policies	 become	 harsher,	 what	
matters	 is	 whether	 practices	 change	 or	 not	 because,	 if	 it	 is	 the	 latter,	 policy	 changes	 can	 be	
neutralized	(Tonry	2007:	1	and	12).	Hence,	the	enactment	of	a	law	with	more	severe	sanctions	
itself	is	not	a	conclusive	indicator	for	harsher	policies	being	implemented.	
	
We	saw	that	the	new	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia	has	enacted	multiple	laws	establishing	new	
crimes,	often	answering	to	claims	from	different	interest	groups.	Nevertheless,	we	do	not	think	
that	this	is	any	proof	of	penal	populism—from	above	or	from	below	(Sozzo	2013,	2014;	Tonry	
2007:	1,	12).43	We	rather	think	that	this	is	evidence	of	a	process	of	growing	self‐determination	of	
crime	policy.	Bolivian	officials	use	the	term	of	‘nationalization’	when	they	talk	about	the	change	
affecting	the	anti‐narcotic	policies	(CONALTD	2011:	16).		
	
We	argue	that	self‐determination	is	a	more	fitting	term	that	can	be	used	in	reference	to	crime	
policy	 in	 general,	 because	 the	 policies	 contained	 in	 laws	 have	 always	 been	 national	 but	 not	
necessarily	 self‐determining.	 Indeed,	 at	 the	beginning	of	 the	 century,	 about	60	per	 cent	of	 all	
prisoners	were	doing	time	for	drug‐related	offences.	Today	this	percentage	has	dropped	to	about	
20	 per	 cent.	 Nowadays,	 other	 crimes,	 such	 as	 robbery	 and	 rape,	 make	 up	 for	 the	 similar	
proportions	 (23	 per	 cent	 and	 20	 per	 cent,	 respectively).	 New	 crimes—for	 example,	 fraud	 in	
sports,	violence	against	women	or	political	corruption—have	been	created	to	clearly	respond	to	
national	problems	and	political	claims.		
	
Tonry	 (2007:	 32)	 argues	 that	 ‘few	 officials	 in	 any	Western	 country	 would	 argue	 that	 public	
attitudes	and	beliefs	are	inappropriate	considerations	in	setting	general	policies,	within	certain	
limits’.	We	argue	 that	 the	same	applies	 in	the	case	of	Bolivia.	We	believe	that	 the	country	has	
chosen	to	use	public	opinion	rather	than	international	pressure	as	its	main	source	for	legitimizing	
changes	 of	 crime	 policy	 that	 have	 led	 to	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 prison	 and	 remand	 populations.	
Nevertheless,	we	also	argued	that	the	punitive	intent	of	some	of	these	reforms	were	neutralized	
in	practice.	Part	of	the	steep	increase	of	the	Bolivian	prison	population	can	be	understood	as	a	
result	of	institutional	deficiencies	and	increases	in	remand	rather	than	as	direct	consequences	of	
a	more	‘punitive’	or	‘populist’	legal	policy.		
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1	Sozzo	(2014:	110;	2016:	13‐17)	noted	that	Ecuador	between	2006	to	2010	was	an	exception	to	this	rule.	
Nevertheless,	as	Paladines	(2016:	167)	noted,	this	has	changed.	
2	As	many	other	social	scientists,	we	do	not	consider	that	xenophobic	political	movements	and	new	leftist	
ones	can	be	analyzed	by	the	same	broad	and	vague	concept	of	‘populism’.	Even	if	they	may	share	some	
political	 communicational	 strategies—anti‐establishment	 discourse,	 mobilization	 of	 emotions,	
schmittian	 friend‐enemy	 dichotomy,	 appeal	 of	 the	 national	 sovereignty	 and	 so	 on—the	 xenophobic	
western	movements	do	not	question	the	neoliberal	hegemony	(Laclau	2005;	Mouffe	2007).	
3	John	Pratt	(2007:	2)	explains	that	penal	populism	is	a	‘concept	with	a	short	history’.	Its	origins	lie	in	the	
work	of	Sir	Anthony	Bottoms	(1995)	who	coined	the	term	‘populist	punitiveness’	to	describe	one	of	the	
four	main	 influences	 which	 he	 saw	 at	 work	 on	 contemporary	 criminal	 justice	 and	 penal	 systems	 in	
modern	society.	As	such,	it	was	‘intended	to	convey	the	notion	of	politicians	tapping	into	and	using	for	
their	own	purposes,	what	they	believe	to	be	the	public’s	generally	punitive	stance’.	See	also	Pratt	et	al.	
2005.	
4For	more	information	on	CONALTID,	see	the	institutional	website	at	
http://conaltid.gob.bo/web/institucion/conaltid	(accessed	25	April	2017).	(See	also	CONALTID	2011,	
2017).	
5	See	art.	83	and	92	of	Law	1008.	
6	Art.	16	and	21	of	Law	906.		
7	Art.	11	of	Law	906.	
8	Law	906	only	repeals	art.	1	to	31	of	Law	1008	(see	Única	Disposición	Derogatoria).	The	draft	bill	on	a	new	
Penal	 and	Procedural	 Law	 (Código	del	Sistema	Penal),	 under	discussion	 in	 the	Bolivian	parliament,	 if	
passed,	eliminates	also	the	penal	provisions	of	Law	1008.		
9	In	2000,	the	total	prison	population	of	Bolivia	was	at	8,124;	4,753	prisoners	(58.5	per	cent)	were	detained	
for	 drug	 offences	 (Bolivia’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 (INE),	 Table	 No.	 3090404.	 Available	 at	
http://www.ine.gob.bo/index.php/introduccion‐6/introduccion‐5	(accessed	25	April	2017).	
10	In	2016,	Bolivia	counted	a	prison	population	of	15,056	persons;	2.977	(19.8	per	cent)	were	detained	for	
drug	 related	 offences	 (July	 2016	 data	 contained	 in	 an	 internal	 document	 of	 the	 Penitentiary	 General	
Direction	(Dirección	General	de	Régimen	Penitenciario)	DGRP‐EST	Nro.	038/16).	
11	We	are	referring	to	the	Laws	number	004,	007,	026,	037,	045,	054,	065,	100,	170,	186,	211,	243,	254,	
262,	263	,264,	316,	317,	348,	367,	369,	371,	393,	400,	450,	466,	477,	530,	535,	548,	553,	700,	755	and	
804.	(See	also	Fundación	Construir	2012:	26‐34).	
12	We	are	referring	to	the	Laws	number	1008,	1333,	1674,	1768,	1778,	1990,	2033,	2492,	2494,	2625,	3325,	
3326	and	3729.	
13	Art.	25	of	Law	004	published	31	of	March	2010.	
14	Art.	10	y	11	of	Law	004.	
15	Art.	6	of	Law	004.	
16	See	art.	83	and	following,	Law	1008.	
17	See	art.	91	and	following,	Law	1008.	
18	See	art.	132,	Law	1008.	
19	Art.	7	num.	2,	Law	004.	
20	The	by‐then	Vice	President	of	Bolivia,	Carlos	Mesa‐Gisbert	(2017:	100‐114),	tries	to	explain	the	reasons	
for	the	collapse	of	the	political	system	and	identifies	corruption	to	be	one	of	them.	
21	An	interesting	investigation	on	security	in	El	Alto	follows	that	the	consequence	of	this	absence	was	a	
process	of	collectivization	and	outsourcing	of	security	(Mollericana,	Tinini	and	Paredes	2007:	87).		
22	On	the	difficulties	of	comparing	statistics	across	border	see	(Kunz	2008:	194).	
23	See	art	281	quinquies	and	sexies	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code.	
24	If	we	look	at	earlier	figures,	it	is	possible	to	observe	that,	in	1991,	80	per	cent	of	persons	deprived	of	
liberty	had	not	received	a	final	judgment	(Lorenzo	2009).	
25	Art.	250	of	Law	1970.	
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26	The	original	name	is:	‘Ley	Integral	para	garantizar	a	las	mujeres	una	vida	libre	de	violencia’.	
27	See	art.	83	of	Law	348	that	modifies	art.	308	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code.		
28	Art.	252	bis	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code.		
29	Art.	272	bis	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code.	
30	Art.	312,	Fourth	Part	of	the	Bolivian	Criminal	Code.	See	art.	84	of	Law	348.		
31	Art.	86	num.	13	of	Law	348.	
32	Hammergren	(2008:	96)	states	on	this	point:	‘In	some	sense,	the	principal	benefits	of	the	reforms	stop	at	
the	courthouse	or	lawyers’	doors.	Judges	have	better	housing	and	salaries,	and	lawyers	can	now	file	by	
internet,	but	the	ordinary	client	confronts	a	complex,	unintelligible,	and	costly	obstacle	course.	As	for	the	
promises	of	positive	impacts	on	extra‐system	goals—democracy,	growth,	or	poverty	reduction—while	
perhaps	a	moot	point	because	of	the	incomplete	first‐order	improvements,	there	are	doubts	as	to	whether	
they	would	occur	even	in	the	best	of	circumstances’.	
33	Bolivian	Police	(2012:	118).		
34	Bolivian	Police	(2016:	2).	
35	General	Prosecutor	of	the	Plurinational	State	of	Bolivia	(2014:	116).		
36	We	translate	‘imputación	formal’	with	formal	charge,	because	the	prosecutor	has	to	communicate	the	
incriminating	facts	formally	to	the	suspect	(art.	302	Law	1970).	By	the	time	a	formal	charge	is	written,	
the	prosecutor	still	can	apply	alternative	sanctions	or	archive	the	case	(see	art.	323	Law	1970).		
37	See	Statistical	Yearbooks	[Anuario	Estadístico]	from	the	Judicial	Council	(2015:	604).	
38	Art.	304	of	Law	1970.	
39	See	art.	300	of	Law	1970.	
40	See	art.	301	num.	2	of	Law	1970.	
41	Se	art.	301	num.	3	of	Law	1970.	
42	See	art.	297,	Law	1970	
43	 Tonry	 (2007:	 1,	 12)	 finds,	 in	 relation	 to	 western	 countries,	 that	 ‘if	 penal	 populism	 or	 populist	
punitiveness	exists	at	all,	it	is	mostly	as	reifications	in	academics'	minds	of	other	academics'	ideas’.		
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